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Abstract   
The present path and nature of technological innovation is such as to reduce dramati-
cally the labour coefficients in the production processes nearly in every sector and surely in 
the productive system taken as a whole. This issue, which is linked to the concept of “te-
chnological unemployment” evoked by Keynes,  is considered both under a theoretical and 
an empirical perspective, and it leads to explore the most viable way out of the problem of 
this kind of unemployment, which is the shortening of the working time. The paper explores 
the complexity, the technical problems and some policy implications of this solution. Fi-
nally, some intermediate, less radical, measures in this direction are considered. 
JEL Classification: E23, J21, O33. 
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La natura e il tasso di progresso tecnico attualmente in atto sono tali da ridurre dramma-
ticamente i coefficienti di lavoro pressoché in tutti i processi produttivi e sicuramente nel 
sistema economico nel suo complesso. Ciò genera un problema del tipo di quello individua-
to da Keynes come “Technological Unemployment”. Il paper esplora questo problema sotto 
un profilo teorico ed empirico e prende in considerazione la soluzione basata sulla riduzione 
del tempo di lavoro. La complessità, i problemi tecnici e le implicazioni di politica econo-
mica relative a  tale soluzione vengono esaminate approfonditamente. Infine vengono sugge-
rite alcune misure intermedie e meno radicali in questa direzione. 
JEL Classification:E23, J21, O33.  
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The explanations of (and the policies against) unemployment are still 
based on traditional views about the working of the economy and particu-
larly of the labour market. According to this view involuntary unemplo-
yment is  essentially due either to difficulties in “matching” demand and 
supply, or to wages higher than the equilibrium level of full employment. 
The inability of wages to adjust to the equilibrium level is in turn ascribed 
either to trade unions interfering against the free working of market forces 
or to dynamics of new-keynesian kind such as efficiency wages or implicit 
contracts or “insiders –outsiders” models. 
This view is nothing but an extension to macroeconomics of the microe-
conomic principle of equilibrium of the individual firm in a perfect compe-
tition world. Ignoring the role of aggregate demand, the demand for labour 
can simply be assumed as a decreasing function of wage levels due to de-
creasing marginal productivity of factors. But if aggregate demand is con-
sidered, the growth of employment as a consequence of falling wages re-
quires to assume the existence of either the so called “Keynes effect” or the 
“Pigou effect”. The first relies on the increase of investment demand due to 
the fall of interest rate which follows the increase in real money supply 
when prices fall as a consequence of declining wages; the second relies on 
the increase in consumer demand due to the increase in the real value of fi-
nancial assets, assuming consumption demand to be a function of wealth as 
well of income. 
As is well known, several objections can be raised against the actual 
working of these effects. Just to mention a few: consider the elasticity of 
investment to interest rates, or the role of the real rate of interest, or the 
strategic behavior of consumers in times of falling prices. 
The possible co-existence of equilibrium wage level with disequilibrium 
in the labor market and equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply 
has been proved by Clower (Clower 1965) in opposition to the Walrasian 
general equilibrium model. The distinction between “notional” and “effec-
tive” aggregate demand allowed then Malinvaud (Malinvaud 1977) to cla-
rify the distinction between “classical” and “Keynesian” unemployment, 
pointing out two different obstacles to the achievement  of  full emplo-
yment: on the one hand the relation between wages and marginal  productivity 
of labour and on the other hand the insufficient effective aggregate demand. 
In this frame the economic policies suggested by the European Union 
and generally implemented by member states with heavier unemployment 
problems have taken a rather funny shape. On one side a cut in wages has 
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been advocated and attained, on the other side the awareness of its negative 
effect on aggregate demand has been handled with the idea that foreign 
demand would have compensated the fall in domestic demand. But unfor-
tunately the supposed fall in prices due to reduced wages didn’t show able 
to compensate the productivity gap to the extent necessary to gain competi-
tiveness in the world, and particularly the European, market. 
Consciousness, although late acquired, of the failure of such approach in 
dealing with the problem of unemployment has recently pushed our policy 
makers to reduce the emphasis on the supply side of the labour market  
(which has been the main limit of the Lisbona strategy and the following 
updates) and to address the issue of aggregate demand. But with regard to 
its components of consumer and investment demand the approach has not 
been appropriate, since it has fundamentally underestimated the role of di-
sposable income distribution as far as the first is concerned and overestima-
ted the role of the interest rate with regard to the second. 
Obviously, supply side labour policies are necessary in order to reduce 
frictional and structural unemployment: the Beveridge curve has to be shif-
ted to the left and the rise of the natural rate of unemployment has to be a-
voided. But the real issue nowadays is: since the achievement of equili-
brium between labour demand and supply is obstructed by the two con-
straints (one relative to wage-marginal productivity ratio and one relative to 
insufficient effective demand) is it possible to increase aggregate demand 
up to totally remove the second constraint? In other words, can demand 
management policies make aggregate demand and output grow such as to 
be able to absorb all the labour supply (allowing for structural and frictional 
unemployment)? If not, the target of full employment should be abandoned  
and commitment should be turned to take care of those who cannot be in-
volved in productive activity not because of “matching” problems, but be-
cause they exceed the labour imput requirements of the economic system. 
In the following sections we shall explore this question, first by reconside-
ring the definition of full employment and of “labour demand”, then by 
questioning the compatibility between technical progress and the target of 
full employment, and finally by considering policies to conciliate increa-
sing technical progress with ensuring full employment. 
 
 
1. The notion of full employment and of demand for labour 
 
In order to proceed it is necessary first to emphasize some aspects of 
these two notions. Clearly a situation of full employment is not one in 
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which everybody has got a payed job. People not in working age, people 
who are not willing to work, people whose qualifications do not match the 
qualifications required to fulfill the vacancies and people  who are delayed 
in the process of finding out and fulfilling the vacancies are all people wi-
thout job who do not contradict a situation of full employment. When no 
other people than these are jobless there is full employment, which amounts 
to say that labour demand and labour supply are numerically equivalent. 
But this apparently straightforward definition suffers of ambiguities both 
on operative and conceptual grounds. On operative ground it’s difficult to 
account for people who are willing to work but do not engage in positive 
actions of job search and for people who would be willing to work only un-
der particular conditions. On the demand side while it’ easy to measure that 
segment which has given rise to employment it is awkward to take accurate 
account of demand which has not been matched by supply. On the theoreti-
cal level, the above definition is tied to the notion of “clearing of the 
market” and it  corresponds “to the point of intersection between the supply 
curve and the demand curve (Robinson, 1937, p.171) But if the assumption 
is made that both the demand and the supply functions are sensitive to en-
dogenous variables besides the real wage, the notion of full employment 
based on the clearing of the aggregate labour market becomes ambiguous. 
It would be better to adopt another conceptual definition, such as the one 
given, again, by Joan Robinson: (ib, p.15) that situation in which “ no one 
employer can increase his staff without reducing the staff of some other 
employer, or “one entrepreneur can increase the amount of labour he em-
ploys  only by reducing the amount employed by someone else”. Still clea-
rer is the notion of full employment adopted by Keynes, which in addition 
is also connected with the notion of aggregate demand. According to Ke-
ynes the condition of full employment is the one in which the size of em-
ployment is inelastic with respect to rising effective demand; that is when, 
for a given technology, output cannot growth because of lack of labour 
force.  “a zero elasticity of supply for output means that an increase of de-
mand in terms of money will lead to no change in output; that is to say , 
prices will rise in the same proportion as the money demand rises. Inflation 
will have no effect on output or employment., but only on prices…. Indeed, 
the condition in which the elasticity of the supply  of output as a whole is 
zero is, I now think, the most convenient criterion for defining full emplo-
yment” (Keynes, 1973, p.106). In other words, output can grow only if te-
chnology and productivity increase and, it has to be noticed, conversely if 
technology and productivity increase, full employment can be maintained 
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only if output grows. This ca be considered the basis for the subsequent 
warning by Keynes about “technological unemployment”. 
Coming to the conceptual definition of “demand for labour” it has to be 
refined In one aspect. Whatever the variable on which it is considered de-
pendent, it cannot be meant in terms of “workers”, but in terms of “quantity 
of work”, possibly hours of work. The technology of the economy, in fact, 
defines the input coefficients of labour in terms of quantity of work and not 
of workers. Converting the quantity of work into quantity of workers requi-
res a passage of institutional nature (as such subject to discretionary chan-
ges): precisely, the hours of work per employee. In fact the total output of 
an economy is given, again for a given technology, by productivity per hour 
multiplied by the number of hours worked per employee multiplied by the 
number of workers actually employed. As a consequence, for a given pro-
ductivity per hour, total output may change even when the number of em-
ployees does not change provided the hours worked per employee do chan-
ge, or, vice versa, when the hours worked per employee do not change if 
the level of employment changes. Or, total output may remain constant if 
both variables change but in opposite and compensating directions. These 
qualifications are of great importance when dealing with the real question: 
whether it is possible to achieve the target of full employment through ap-




2. Technical progress and technological unemployment 
 
When introducing the role of technical progress with regard to the goal 
of full employment it must be born in mind that although it can be neutral, 
or labour saving or capital saving, either in the Hicks or in the Harrod sen-
se, it is always labour saving in absolute terms because it always reduces 
the labour input coefficients of production. Therefore it always implies a 
rise of labour productivity. This concept is very tricky, as it is nearly undi-
stinguishable from the productivity of any other factor of production (Fad-
da 2013), nor the growth accountancy gives satisficing answers to the pro-
blem. Still, for our purpose we can use the crude concept of labour produc-
tivity as the  ratio between total output and total labour input. Therefore we 
identify technical progress with its effect of increasing labour productivity. 
In order to explore the relationship between the goal of full employment 
and the presence of technical progress the first step has to be devoted to the 
question of the impact of rising productivity on the level of employment. 
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This problem can be (and it has been) considered under an empirical per-
spective and under a theoretical approach. The empirical perspective gene-
rally leads to conclude that historically no positive relationship has emer-
ged between productivity growth and unemployment. The classical stan-
dard reference is to the fact that since when the worries of the luddism star-
ted to pervade the world of workers, the predictions of massive unemplo-
yment due to technological change have always proven false. More detailed 
empirical investigations reach more refined conclusions, sometimes revea-
ling that although in the short run there may be a positive  relationship it 
disappears or turns negative in the long run. Two empirical studies, though, 
are particularly worth mentioning. The first (Benigno 2010), based mainly 
on US data, finds out a positive relationship between productivity growth 
and employment in the long run, but a negative one between a rise in the 
variance of productivity growth and employment. The explanations could 
be grounded on the slow process of adjustment of wages to productivity 
growth (Ball & Mankiw 2002, Pissarides 2009), which would let 
production costs decline, profits increase, and consequently the demand for 
labour be pushed up by more investment and economic growth. On the o-
ther hand, in case of downwards shift of the pace of productivity growth the 
increase in wages according to expectations would make profits shrink cau-
sing a reduction in the demand for labour in order to protect profits. 
The second lot of empirical considerations that I think worth mentioning 
comes from   J. Mason (2015). The data that he reports show that “Ten-year 
periods with high growth of productivity invariably also have low unem-
ployment rates; periods of high average unemployment are invariably also 
periods of slow productivity growth”. This is as far as the Us are concer-
ned, plus Japan and some other countries, while many other countries show 
inverse relationships. Relative to these data It can be observed in the first 
place that the causal direction of the relationship is not established. It may 
well be that technical progress and productivity growth are able to speed up 
the growth of the economy so that the demand for labour rises, but it may 
also be the other way round: when unemployment falls and labour becomes 
scarce employers are stimulated to speed up the process of innovation, also 
increasing the level of ouput due to high aggregate demand. In addition,  
changes in output and employment could be strongly influenced by mone-
tary and fiscal policy, something which obviously would discredit any 
straight relationship between productivity and employment. 
A second observation concerns the different shapes that the above corre-
lation shows in different countries. This really poses a problem: there must 
be other aspects (which are to be detected) able to affect this relationship. It 
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may be differences in the kind of innovation, it may be differences in la-
bour market institutions and regulations, it may be differences in the world 
trade position, it may be differences in content and timing of economic po-
licy. When dealing with the problems of maintaining the target of full em-
ployment in the long run in presence of technical progress these aspects 
will prove of fundamental importance. 
A final but essential consideration about the empirics of the evolution of 
this relationship is that the historical trend cannot be assumed to continue 
as such in the future. There is no reason to believe that the new inventions 
of the future will have the same effect on the labour market as in the past. 
There is no reason to say that the growth of output will have in the future 
the same pace of the past. Perhaps in the past all kinds of polluting activi-
ties did not have significant effects on climate change, but they do in the 
present, and probably will do to a larger extent in the future. Similarly, the 
fact that all the past predictions have proven wrong says nothing about how 
the variables involved are going to behave in the future. It is not correct to 
infer from the past the evolution of the future. So, being unable to rely on 
past experience, particularly in times of deep and fast changes, we are for-
ced to look for light in the theory. 
Economic theory on this topic is mainly derived from neoclassical ap-
proaches. Among the classical economists, Ricardo (Ricardo 1817) in his 
well-known chapter 31 on machinery saw a conflict between mechanization 
and employment, while Marx saw in the growth of the “organic composi-
tion of capital” on the one hand a way of forcing wages to subsistence level 
but on the other hand a root from which an underconsumption crisis of the 
system would develop (Marx,1993). 
Neoclassical models generally deny a negative effect of productivity in-
crease on employment in the long run although they admit it could tempo-
rarily show in the short run. “Many structural shocks that initially create a 
positive trade-off between productivity and unemployment set in motion a 
dynamic path of adjustment involving capital accumulation or decumula-
tion that in principle can eliminate the trade off”(Gordon 1995 p.4). In  So-
low’s model of growth, full employment is unaffected by technical 
progress, since an increase in investment will accompany the shift of the 
production function as well as the increase in the capital/labour ratio.  Even 
according to Layard’s approach the equilibrium unemployment rate is not 
affected by changes in technology: “Unemployment in the long run is inde-
pendent of capital accumulation and technical progress” (Layard, p.107). 
Rowthorn, on the other hand has objected that these conclusions are valid 
only on the assumption of a unit elasticity production function (Rowthorn 
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1999). The theoretical literature on this theme is vast, but definitely not 
conclusive, and it looks right to agree with Blanchard, Solow and Wilson 
when they state that “theoretical arguments are unlikely to settle the issue, 
precisely because it turns so decisively on the reaction of aggregate output 
to (favorable or unfavorable) productivity shock. The problem is located at 
the intersection of the demand side and the supply side, the least developed 
and most controversial area of economic theory”. (Blanchard, p.5). 
The complexity of the issue and the various interconnections and possi-
ble lines of causation among the involved variables can be summarized as 
following. 
Consider first the relationship between growth  and productivity. A first 
line of causation goes from productivity to growth and implies a positive 
effect of the first to the latter. This effect is attributed  to reduction of unit 
costs, which will allow the aggregate supply curve to shift down. If the ag-
gregate demand curve remains unchanged the result will be an increase in 
aggregate output. But the aggregate demand curve may shift left or right 
according to whether no new investment and no consumer demand increase 
will take place or more investment in view of higher profits and more con-
sumption demand will follow. If the aggregate demand curve shifts right, 
output will increase still more. But the direction of causality between pro-
ductivity and growth can be reversed. Growth may be the cause of increa-
sing  productivity by virtue of the pro-cyclical conduct implied by Okun’s 
law or by technical progress embodied in the new investments required to 
enlarge productive capacity or also by the pressure towards labour saving 
innovations coming from tighter labour market conditions. 
Turning to consider the relationship between productivity and emplo-
yment, a two ways causation can also be detected. On the one hand produc-
tivity growth is bound to affect the level of employment either positively if 
the consequent growth is strong enough or negatively if  growth is not e-
nough to compensate for labour substitution. In addition, structural effects 
may take place regarding polarization, wages and long term unemployment 
owning to skill biased technical change. On the other hand a reverse positi-
ve causation may go from employment to productivity as a consequence of 
increasing scarcity and wages, while increasing unemployment and decli-
ning wages would lead to a slowdown of productivity. The positive impact 
of employment on productivity would also mitigate the price rise, lessening 
in this way the constraints of the Phillips curve. 
A similar view about these relationships, which will also help to answer 
the question whether full employment in the long run is compatible with 
continuous technical progress, can be found in Pasinetti’s approach (Pasi-
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netti 1993). Technical progress will reduce labour coefficients of 
production at different paces in different sectors. Some sectors will be 
stronger affected than others. Taking account of these different reductions, 
plus  the different output dynamics  of each sector, plus the weight of each 
sector in the aggregate output, plus the creation of new productive sectors it 
is possible to establish the net balance in aggregate terms between the de-
struction and the creation of new jobs which follow the introduction of te-
chnical progress. As Pasinetti says, in different historical periods it could 
well be that this balance is positive, and that only problems of adjustment 
of the labour force, mobility, education and training need to be solved. In 
that case appropriate active labour policies would be sufficient to put things 
right. But it may also be that this balance is negative, and it will be so when 
the rate of output growth in aggregate terms is not sufficient to compensate 
for the destruction of jobs operated by technological innovation. In this ca-
se no active labour policies would be able to find employment for the loss 
of jobs that cannot be replaced. This is the problem that Keynes forecasted 
when he said: “We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some 
readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a gre-
at deal in the years to come--namely, technological unemployment. This 
means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the 




3. Should we give up the goal of full employment? 
 
The problem is how to cope with the possibility foreseen by Keynes, or, 
in other words, how to  avoid that full employment be held back by techni-
cal progress. It is clear that what is true at the industry level is also true for 
the economy as a whole: aggregate labour demand is bound to increase 
with productivity growth if aggregate output is sufficiently elastic, and will 
decline if aggregate output is not adequately elastic. Therefore the final and 
also long run impact on employment depends on the elasticity of both con-
sumer and investment demand. Both price and income elasticities have to 
be considered. Obviously, since the labour coefficient reduction affects also 
additional output, its rate of growth has to be higher than the rate of reduc-
tion of labour inputs per unit of production in order to compensate for te-
chnical progress job destruction. A particular interpretation of the 
production function makes the problem still worse. Considering, as Sum-
mer does (Summer 2013), a production function of the kind: Y = F(βK, L + 
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λ(1−β)K), where one unit of capital is equivalent to λ units of labour, al-
lows to make a distinction between two uses of the stock of capital: one 
part for the customary use and the other part to substitute for labour. As 
more capital will be reallocated to substitute for labour, output will increase 
but, being larger the stock of effective labour and smaller the stock of con-
ventional capital, the wage level will decline. In view of this last effect it is 
not sure that output will grow, and then: “rapid productivity growth asso-
ciated with inelastic demand leads to fewer and fewer people being enga-
ged in the activity” (Summers, 2013, p.4). It is important at this  point to 
notice that this could be a further and more general explanation of the diffe-
rent impact of increasing productivity on employment in different countries 
as mentioned on page 6: it is not the absolute intensity of technical progress 
that matters, but the ratio between this and the rate of economic growth. 
Obviously behind the different growth rates there are different factors in 
different countries. 
In this frame the question becomes: in times of increasingly rapid te-
chnical progress will consumer and investment demand be able to growth at 
a higher speed so as to achieve the goal of full employment? And if not, are 
there any means that could be adopted to achieve full employment or 
should we abandon the goal of full employment altogether? 
The question can be split in two parts. The first part is: are we in times 
of such  “dangerously” rapid technical change that full employment may be 
rendered impossible?  And the second is: what ca be done if we are there or 
nearly there? 
The literature on the topic of present rapid increase of technical change 
is burgeoning and it sounds like we are witnessing something completely 
different from the past. It is not like substituting  looms for workers or 
trains for horses. It is far beyond ICT revolution, it looks like progressively 
transferring to robotics most of the tasks up to now performed by human 
workers. Jeremy Rifkin (Rifkin 1995) began many years ago to foresee 
mass unemployment as the fundamental problem of 21st century. Martin 
Ford (Ford 2009) expects the workers expelled by technological innovation 
from productive activity not to be able to find employment in other sectors 
in the next few decades. The race against machines (Brynjolfsson and  
McAfee, 2011) is such as to bring Frey and Osborne (2013) to predict that 
47% of jobs currently existing in the US will vanish in the next two deca-
des, while Jeremy Bowles (2014) foresees a net loss of 50% of today jobs 
in Europe in the next decades. In several occasions Ulrich Beck (Beck 
2009) has drawn the attention on the prospect that in the next decade the 
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employment of only 50% of the working age population would be enough 
to produce all the goods and services demanded in advanced countries. 
It seems therefore that we are close to the point in which the speed of 
job destruction caused by such rapid and deep technological progress will 
hardly be compensated by job creation due to consumer and investment 
demand. The production of all the goods and services to match  aggregate 
demand would require the employment of only a fraction of the available 
labour; or, reciprocally, if full employment were attained this would lead to 
overproduction which would revert the economy to permanent persistent 
unemployment. It seems that we have reached at aggregate level that para-
doxical situation depicted by Bertrand Russel with reference to a single in-
dustry. “Suppose that, at a given moment, a certain number of people are 
engaged in the manufacture of pins. They make as many pins as the world 
needs, working (say) eight hours a day. Someone makes an invention by 
which the same number of men can make twice as many pins: pins are alre-
ady so cheap that hardly any more will be bought at a lower price. In a sen-
sible world, everybody concerned in the manufacturing of pins would take 
to working four hours instead of eight, and everything else would go on as 
before. But in the actual world this would be thought demoralizing. The 
men still work eight hours, there are too many pins, some employers go 
bankrupt, and half the men previously concerned in making pins are thrown 
out of work. There is, in the end, just as much leisure as on the other plan, 
but half the men are totally idle while half are still overworked. In this way, 
it is insured that the unavoidable leisure shall cause misery all round inste-
ad of being a universal source of happiness. Can anything more insane be 
imagined?” (Russel 1935, p.16) 
Obviously Russel didn’t imagine that either rising wages in the pin sec-
tor or falling prices of pins could have increased the demand for other go-
ods in such a way as to employ all the workers dismissed in the pin in-
dustry. This is what is accounted for in multisectoral models, where cross 
elasticities of demand play a fundamental role in ascertaining the impact of 
technical progress on employment. But if the reduction of labour input co-
efficients is extended to all the economy, if the substitution of human work 
with machines or robots pervades all sectors, then the preservation  of same 
levels  of aggregate employment is conditional on adequate increase of ag-
gregate production. The problem, therefore, is  whether it is possible for 
aggregate demand to grow up to such a required level. The problem may 
also be exacerbated by the fact that the initial fall in unemployment will 
work towards a reduction in consumer demand. Unless the pace of aggrega-
te output growth is higher than that of aggregate productivity increase (me-
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asured as a weighted average of all sectors) it will impossible to avoid a fall 
in employment as a consequence of technological change, and therefore it 
will impossible to maintain the goal of full employment. 
Since it is out of question the possibility and also the opportunity of 
slowing down the path of innovation (it wouldn’t make sense to delay the 
reduction of the human effort required per unit of production), it is on the 
other side of the ratio, i.e. the speed of output growth, that possible actions 
are to be considered if the goal of full employment is to be maintained. 
Of course,  monetary and fiscal policies must come to play in this re-
gard, as well as real policies such as industrial policies, agricultural poli-
cies, research policies, and so on. But since consumer demand is the key 
variable, both in itself and in its role relative to the investment function,  it 
is towards its growth that action should be directed. To this end, a most ef-
fective and structural measure would be to attain a less unequal income di-
stribution. As Keynes said, ”measures for the redistribution of incomes in a 
way likely to raise the   propensity to consume may prove positively favou-
rable to the growth of capital” (Keynes, 1967, p.373). 
Although empirical evidence and theoretical debates are less than con-
clusive about the impact of unequal distribution on the rate of growth, the 
prevailing hypothesis  is that of a negative relationship between the two 
(Fadda, 2015). The available measures towards a reduction of income ine-
quality range from those directed to affect the market distribution  (before 
tax and transfers) to those directed to change the disposable income distri-
bution. Although the first ones should be preferred, also the second ones 
could be effective if well designed. Careful design is required to avoid di-
stortive effects that could turn to be worse than the inequality they are me-
ant to correct (Fadda, 2015). Transfers, both in money and in kind, could be 
particularly effective in rising aggregate demand beyond the level reached 
with the original market distribution.  
Social expenditure could be a second and powerful  tool to control the 
ratio between productivity increase and output growth. The provision of 
public goods and social services financed out of taxation of top incomes or 
through public debt would help to support aggregate demand. 
A third way of providing a stimulus to labour demand when jobs are lost 
because of technological change is that of stimulating, actually with speci-
fic policies aimed at  exploiting the possibilities open by same technologi-
cal progress, the production of new goods and of new services to which a 
growing paying demand would be addressed. This additional demand could 
come from either the wage increase due to productivity growth or from the 
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price fall, and would  be a reflection of the evolution of needs and tastes as 
the standard of living rises.  
All these measures are right, but they do not solve the problem. In case 
of excessively wide gap between labour demand and supply and in case of 
accelerating and deep technical change, relying only on these measure 
could lead to an obsessive search for  a continuous increase of the rate of 
growth. GDP growth would be pursued, in this case,  not   for the sake of 
generating social welfare and responding to social needs, but only for the 
sake of creating new jobs, in an endless spiral escalation. Furthermore, in 
the long run such a rate of growth could easily turn to be unsustainable un-
der several points of view. Both because neither natural resources nor hu-
man needs are unlimited,  this  process is bound to crash in the long run a-
gainst a destructive consumistic exasperation or/and against an insuperable   
limit of overproduction. The measures above are useful and also necessary 
as countercyclical and stabilization policies, but their ability to reach and 
maintain full employment in a world of continuous deep and accelerating 
technical progress of the kind we are starting to witness is doubtful, not to 
say hopeless . Actually the economy may be trapped between an unsustai-
nable rate of growth and an unsustainable rate of unemployment. The need 
to escape this trap requires that other options be considered. 
 
 
4. The reduction of working time 
 
An alternative way to conciliate increasing technical progress and full 
employment comes from the distinction made above between reduction of 
labour input coefficients and reduction of “workers” coefficients. Taking 
account of this, the problem could be reduced to an elementary arithmetical 
sequence. If the total amount of working hours required for an output that 
equals aggregate demand falls and this total amount is divided by the num-
ber of workers, the result is the number of work hours per worker which is 
needed to keep constant the level of employment. If the starting point is one 
of full employment, implementing this calculation  would neutralize the job 
destruction effect of technical progress, and the advantage of productivity 
increase would be entirely translated on the variable of working time per 
worker. 
Undoubtedly the historical evolution shows a path of working hours re-
duction, although this has been caused more by workers’ demands for bet-
ter quality of life than by deliberate labour policy choices. From the origi-
nal working time with no limits of regulatory or contractual kind of the first 
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industrial revolution, a first step forwards has been the English Factory Act 
of 1833, which imposed a limit of eight hours a day for workers aged be-
tween 9 and 13 and of 12 hours for workers aged between 14 and 18. Later, 
in 1850, a limit of 10 working hours a day was imposed for everyone. In 
France the revolutionary government imposed in 1848 a general limit of 10 
hours a day in Paris and 11 in the province. In Italy, in 1860 the daily  
working hours were about 15, while in 1923 it was established by law a 
length of 8 hours per day and 48 per week. Collective agreements in the se-
venties reduced it to 40 hours in five days. More recently, tentative measu-
res of further reductions have appeared in France and in Germany. 
A description of the comparative situation at present time is given in the 
following graph 
 
Fig. 1 - Working hours per worker in the Oecd countries (2008) 
Source: Oecd Statistics. 
 
It is worth noticing that countries which have an average working time 
per worker comparatively higher than others (such as Greece and Italy) ha-
ve also a lower productivity per worker, and vice versa.  
The above simple arithmetical sequence could be refined in the follo-
wing way. Suppose an economy is at full employment and an accelerated 
and deep technical progress takes place. Then, full employment could be 
maintained by adjusting the productivity per worker trough a reduction of 
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working hours in proportion with the rate of growth of productivity per 
hour minus the rate of growth of aggregate demand. Of course this kind of 
rule implies that productivity per hour is intended in the “crude” sense 
mentioned above, and that the average changes be weighted for the diffe-
rent sectors or industries of the economy. 
Even so, the implementation of this rule, its conversion into measures of 
economic policy is far some simple. Three main problems arise. The first is 
concerned with the organization of production processes, the second with 
the behavior of wages, the third with differences in sectoral productivity 
changes. 
With regard to the first, let’s imagine that technological innovations 
bring in the firm an increase of the ratio between output and labour input, 
that is an increase of labour productivity in the above sense. It will a-
wkward for the firm to reduce proportionally the working time of employe-
es such as to leave the number of employed unchanged. This would be te-
chnically difficult for more than one reasons. 
In the first place, the technology of each production process does not of-
fer an elasticity of substitution between factors such as to permit move-
ments along a “continuum” in a kind of “fine tuning” by matching increa-
ses in productivity with corresponding splitting of the specific task of one 
worker into different complementary workers. There are discontinuities (of 
different extent according to specific tasks and stages of the production 
process) that, if disregarded by hasty  redistributions of the working time, 
would create a disruption in the process which would neutralize all the gain 
of productivity increases. 
In the second place, the reduction in total unit costs due to technological 
change would affect differently variable and fixed costs. Possibly, changes 
in fixed costs (such as cleaning, maintenance, administration, recruitment 
and so on) would be unaffected by changes in the process of production, 
therefore the reduction in total unit costs would be less than proportional to 
the increase in productivity so that a general cut in the working time pro-
portional to the average increase in productivity would rise fixed unit costs 
making impossible for the firm to maintain the same level of competitive-
ness in the market. 
In fact the conversion of productivity increases into shorter working 
time should be carefully designed in a thorough restructuring of production 
operations  and of  firm organization. The option between fewer working 
hours per day or fewer working days per week is also available. In any case 
an absolute proportionality between productivity growth and working time 
reduction could be hardly managed. 
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The second problem is relative to wage levels. Ignoring the first pro-
blem and assuming that in a manufacturing process the increase in produc-
tivity per worker were accompanied by a strictly proportional reduction in 
the hours worked per worker, the labour cost per unit of production would 
be constant if the worker’s wage was kept constant. In this case the level of 
wages would not benefit from the increase in productivity. If, on the con-
trary, workers wanted to transfer to wages some of the productivity benefit, 
the proportion between productivity growth and working time reduction 
should change accordingly. In other words, workers are faced with a trade-
off between change in wages and change in working time, and this would 
consequently affect the level of employment. With regard to this an impor-
tant point ha to be made. In case of  a working time reduction being gene-
rally imposed as a measure of economic policy,  workers can still keep the 
choice  about this trade-off using the possibility either to engage in other 
short time paid jobs or making themselves available for overtime work (un-
less these were effectively discouraged or prohibited). In this case any posi-
tive impact of shorter working time on employment would vanish. The 
probabilities of this happening are of course linked to the individual  prefe-
rence function; a greater utility attributed to income rather than to free or 
leisure time would act in this direction; something which is non unlikely to 
happen given the growing tendency to engage in a kind of social competi-
tion in terms of consumption and status symbols exhibition. 
The third problem would arise if a general reduction of working time 
were extended to all the economy while different sectors have different ra-
tes of productivity increase. Obviously this would cause either an exit from 
the market of the firms in the sector with lower (or nihil)  productivity 
growth, or a change (which could be very substantial) in relative prices. If 
the society thinks such change inappropriate the Government could act 
through taxes, transfers and subsidies to restore the previous equilibrium. 
An intervention of this kind has been experienced in Sweden in the mid of 
the nineties with a fundamental cooperation with trade unions collective 
bargaining (Erixon, 2008). 
We can conclude that great care has to be taken in designing this kind of 
policies, but that with a careful combination of growth policy and working 
time management it is possible to maintain the goal of full employment e-
ven in times of heavy job destructive technical progress. 
Now a similar but quite different question has to be asked: can a shorte-
ning of the working time be used as a measure to curb the rate of unemplo-
yment even when the economy is far below full employment and unemplo-
yment is not caused by technical progress? What can be done when there is 
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not enough technical progress to be converted into reduction of working 
time to fill the wide gap between demand and supply of labour? In this case 
the limit to the increase of  employment (apart from frictional and structural 
unemployment for which effective active labour policies are appropriate) 
would be set either by wages above the equilibrium level or by insufficient 
aggregate demand. When the latter is the case the question is whether, whi-
le aggregate demand stimuli  are taking time or are unable to achieve its 
growth, it could be of some help to act to convert the total labour input of 
the economy into a larger number of job places through a reduction of the 
working time. It has to be said that this possibility is prejudicially opposed 
by those who think that the labour force unable to find jobs in the 
production of goods and services for the market should be employed in jobs 
to satisfy social needs (such as so called “third sector” activities, no-profit, 
and so on). This would have a double advantage: it would lessen the drive 
towards consumerism (because “absolute” needs and not “relative” needs 
would be involved) and it would rise real wages because private expendi-
ture for basic needs would decline (Valli, 1996). It is clear that this perspec-
tive may be thought as complementary and not in contrast with the above 
said perspective of “redistribution” of jobs, because of political feasibility 
and its risk of state paternalism and also because its public financing would 
in any case require a sufficient level of market production. 
Another radical opposition to the perspective of shortening the working 
time in order to increase employment comes from the argument that the 
supposed increase would be swept away by entrepreneurs’s readiness to 
pay higher wages for more productive workers working longer: since shor-
ter working time and lower unemployment would “worsen the quality of a 
worker’s effort; then a maximizing firm has an incentive to substitute a hi-
gher wage for fewer workers. A decrease in standard working hours thus 
may not result in a lower unemployment rate” (Chun, p.367). This argu-
ment, though, is based on the unproven assumption, of Shapiro efficiency 
wage flavour, that “an increase in unemployment rate motivates the worker 
to furnish much more effort” (ibidem) and vice-versa.  
The main problem of this perspective rests in the relationship with wa-
ges. In fact, should the shortening of working time remain within the limits 
of the increase in productivity, as long as the necessary organization adju-
stments are made,  no rise in labour cost per unit of production would oc-
cur. But if this measure exceeds the increase in productivity, the only choi-
ce is between cutting wages and/or rising production costs. The first choice 
could be dealt with in the frame of the trade-off between income and leisure 
time, the second could be tackled  with cutback of non labour costs and 
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with  infra-industry and international harmonization to avoid loss in compe-
titiveness. Both could be eased with State intervention. Since what matters 
to workers is disposable income and to entrepreneurs gross labour costs, a 
reduction of tax and social security contribution would help protecting both 
net wages and labour costs for unit of production. The most effective use of 
worktime reduction for work sharing with state subsidies has been made in 
Germany during last recession: “Short-time work was the “German an-
swer” to the economic crisis. The number of short-time workers strongly 
increased in the recession and peaked at more than 1.5 million. Without the 
extensive use of short-time work, unemployment would have risen by ap-
proximately twice as much as it actually did (Brenke and others, 2011), al-
though state intervention seems to have led to abuses after the end of the 
crisis.  If a general change of functional distribution were also allowed, the 
possibility of altering the share of profits would add some degree of  free-
dom in  dealing with the problem. 
If a general reduction of working hours imposed by law encounters se-
veral problems of the kind just recalled, an easier path is to create space  for 
flexible and gradual reductions based on personal choices or collective a-
greements. On this line would be the possibility of agreeing voluntary mar-
ginal reductions of working time joined with wage reductions, such as, for 
instance  longer periods of unpaid vacations, or longer temporary  leaves, 
unpaid and for various purposes, or even the possibility of sabbaticals. 
Another option could be to free the part-time work from its features of 
forced, precarious, peripheral and unskilled job and to extend it to volunta-
ry opportunities for central well-structured tasks requiring high responsibil-
ities and high skills.  
Still more, retirement regulations could allow for flexible retiring ages, 
with gradual reduction of working time linked to progressive inclusion of 
young workers in the firm. In this way the concept of working time per 
worker that we have been referring to becomes closer to that of working 
time per person. The ratio between total hours worked and total population 
is bound to decline if the number of pensioners and their life expectancy 
rise and the entry into the labour force of youngsters is delayed. But this 
process doesn’t mean a decline of working hours per worker; on the con-
trary it could call for its growth, turning the process against the work sha-
ring perspective. 
Finally, agreements and regulations which make overtime work less 
costly than standard work should be avoided. All these operative lines must 
be carefully designed and organically conceived as part of a coherent stra-
tegy. This composite strategy of shortening working time requires three pre 
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conditions in order to be effective and not disruptive of the economy: first, 
an efficient labour market working according to the principle of “flexicu-
rity”; second, an improved work organization within the firm following the 
lines of  the “lean production”; third a good degree of international coordi-






A short conclusion can be drawn as following. 
In order to lessen unemployment of “classical” nature, measures con-
cerning wage moderation and active labour market policies are needed; but 
these are not sufficient in order to achieve full employment. 
When unemployment of “Keynesian” nature (as Malinvaud calls it) per-
vades the economy,  the implementation of policies aimed at expanding ef-
fective demand are also needed. But even these are not sufficient when “te-
chnological unemployment” arises. 
When the path and the depth of technical change are such as to make it 
impossible for the rate of growth to keep up with it, then a shortening of the 
working time per worker seems to be also necessary in order to keep the 
goal of full employment. 
This measure, though, has to be carefully designed in order to avoid di-
stortions and negative effects on the economy when applied to specific pro-
ductive sectors. Careful calibration and overall reorganization of operatio-
nal tasks of the productive process of the firms are also needed. In addition, 
it should also be framed in a context of international coordination and har-
monization. 
In the meantime, a set of gradual reforms to help an initial redistribution 
of  the work for which effective demand exists, could be adopted, such as a 
reorganization of “part time” work, a lengthening of vacations and tempo-
rary leaves, a better regulation of overtime work and a flexibility in retire-
ment age. All this should allow a better distribution of the benefits of tech-
nical progress, instead of technology improvements being used to slacken 
the labour market by maintaining constant the working time and making 
more workers compete for fewer jobs and declining wages. 
On these lines one should carefully think about the following Keynes 
plea. Considering the deep practical knowledge of the economy possessed 
by Keynes no one could think of him as just a visionary utopian. 
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“I would predict that the standard of life in progressive countries one 
hundred years hence will be between four and eight times as high as it is to-
day…. For many ages to come the old Adam will be so strong in us that 
everybody will need to do some work if he is to be contented. We shall do 
more things for ourselves than is usual with the rich to-day, only too glad to 
have small duties and tasks and routines. But beyond this, we shall endea-
vour to spread the bread thin on the butter – to make what work there is still 
to be done to be as widely shared as possible. Three-hour shifts or a fifte-
en-hour week may put off the problem for a great while. For three hours a 
day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us!... But beware! 
The time for all this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must 
pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; for 
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